Document 96

Filed 12/08/25

Page 1 of 9 Page ID

Case 2:24-cv-03571-FLA-PVC

Defendant's Reply to the Objection (Dkt. 95).

After having made a *de novo* determination of the portions of the Report to which Objections were directed, the court concurs with and accepts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge, which the court incorporates by reference into this Order. The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that evidentiary sanctions are warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 37(c), due to Plaintiff's failure to: (1) produce mental health records timely, as required by Rule 26(e)(1)(A); and (2) disclose "facts or data" Dr. Judy Ho ("Dr. Ho") relied on in forming her expert opinions, as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii). The court, therefore, PRECLUDES Plaintiff from using on a motion, at a hearing, and at trial: (1) evidence of Plaintiff's mental health treatment by mental health professionals at any time after her termination by Defendant; and (2) Dr. Ho's report and testimony regarding Plaintiff's mental health, mental health treatment, and emotional distress damages.

Plaintiff's counsel is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the R&R and this Order, and submit a declaration attesting to providing Plaintiff with both documents within seven days of the filing of this Order on the court's docket. Failure to comply with this Order and submit a declaration timely may result in the imposition of monetary sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel.

For the sake of completeness, the court will address Plaintiff's objections briefly.

## **DISCUSSION**

## I. Legal Standard

Rule 37(c)(1) provides:

(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:

1 2

(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and

fees, caused by the failure:

3

(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)—(vi).

(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24

25

26

27 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). "Rule 37(c)(1) is an 'automatic' sanction that prohibits the use of improperly

disclosed evidence." Merchant v. Corizon Health, Inc., 993 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2021). "The automatic nature of the rule's application does not mean that a district court must exclude evidence that runs afoul of Rule 26(a) or (e) ..., [r]ather, the rule is automatic in the sense that a district court may properly impose an exclusion sanction where a noncompliant party has failed to show that the discovery violation was either substantially justified or harmless." *Id.* (italics in original). "Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to these disclosure requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed." Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 993 F.3d 733, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). "Courts have upheld the use of the sanction even when a litigant's entire cause of action or defense has been precluded," and even absent a violation of an explicit court order or a showing of bad faith or willfulness. *Id.* "Implicit in Rule 37(c)(1) is that the burden is on the party facing sanctions to prove harmlessness." *Id.* at 1107.

## II. Plaintiff's Objections to the Report

First, Plaintiff contends the court should reject the Magistrate Judge's recommendation because her counsel acted diligently after learning on June 17, 2025, that Plaintiff had received mental health treatment from Mary Marks and Dr. Lisa Morse ("Dr. Morse") beginning in January of that year.<sup>2</sup> Obj. to R&R at 10, 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Plaintiff's Objection to the Report states: "Plaintiff's counsel did not become aware of the specific treatment providers or the relevance of their records until the June 17, 2025 deposition." Obj. to R&R at 14. This language suggests counsel was aware Plaintiff was receiving mental health treatment but chose not to supplement Plaintiff's

According to Plaintiff, "[t]he Report mischaracterizes Plaintiff's conduct and overlooks her repeated, good-faith efforts to obtain treatment records from out-of-state providers Mary Marks and Dr. Lisa Morse," including through "multiple attempts to contact both the individual providers and the Texas-based platform through which services were accessed." Dkt. 84 at 10. The court disagrees.

As detailed in the Report, Plaintiff did not provide any specific facts or evidence regarding her counsel's efforts to contact Mary Marks and Dr. Lisa Morse. Report at 12–14. Plaintiff has not identified: (1) the specific date or dates her counsel attempted to contact these providers; (2) the manner in which such attempts were made; (3) what responses counsel received, if any; or (4) what efforts her counsel made to respond to the providers or follow-up on her request(s) to obtain these records. *See* Obj. to R&R at 10, 17 (Zambrano Decl.) ¶ 5. Plaintiff's assertions that her counsel "acted promptly and in good faith to obtain and protect sensitive data" are vague, conclusory, and insufficient to demonstrate her counsel actually acted diligently and in good faith, as she contends.

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not provide any argument or legal authority to establish that her counsel's efforts—which began three days before the close of fact discovery, at the earliest—were sufficient to excuse Plaintiff and her counsel's failures to supplement her discovery responses timely.<sup>3</sup> Defendant served its first set of RFPs

response to Defendant's Request for Production of Documents ("RFP") (Set One) No. 25 until counsel realized after the June 17, 2025 continued deposition that there could be consequences for the non-disclosure. Nevertheless, for purposes of the subject Motion, the court accepts Plaintiff's assertion that her counsel did not know she was receiving mental health treatment until Plaintiff revealed this fact during her June 17, 2025 continued deposition. *See* Opp'n at 4 ("This treatment was first disclosed at Plaintiff's continued deposition on June 17, 2025.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission—must supplement or correct its disclosure or response: (A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the

on Plaintiff on June 6, 2024. Dkt. 68-1 (Lerner Decl.) ¶ 2. Defendant's RFP (Set One) No. 25 requests: "All DOCUMENTS that SUPPORT YOUR claim for emotional distress damages, including, without limitation, DOCUMENTS that evidence, refer to, or reflect YOUR treatment by any PERSON (including, without limitation, therapists, psychiatrists, psychologists and/or other providers) and medications prescribed to YOU." Dkt. 68-2 at 3.

Plaintiff served her objections and responses to Defendant's RFP (Set One) on July 5, 2024, and her response to RFP (Set One) No. 25 states in relevant part: "After reasonable search and diligent inquiry, Plaintiff will produce responsive documents within her possession, custody and control. Plaintiff is fully complying with this request, and no documents are being withheld for any reason." *Id.* Plaintiff, thus, knew and/or should have been instructed by her counsel that she had a duty to disclose she was receiving mental health treatment and produce all related documents timely if she wanted to use evidence of such treatment in support of her emotional distress damages claim.<sup>4</sup>

///

additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "Counsel in a litigation have legal duties to take proactive steps in supervising and searching for documents in discovery that go far beyond simply acceding to a client who fails (or worse, refuses) to produce or provide documents. Counsel cannot simply advise clients about document requests and leave it up to the client to decide whether or not to risk sanctions for failure to produce – in appropriate circumstances, counsel may need to personally conduct or directly supervise a client's collection, review, and production of responsive documents." *In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig.*, Case No. 4:22-md-03047-YGR (PHK), 2024 WL 4125618, at \*15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2024) (citations and parentheticals omitted); *see also Optronics Techs., Inc. v. Ningbo Sunny Elec. Co.*, Case No. 5:16-cv-06370-EJD (VKD), 2020 WL 2838806, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) ("It is not enough for counsel to provide advice and guidance to a client about how to search for responsive documents, and then not inquire further about whether that advice and guidance were followed.").

Plaintiff offers no explanation for her failure to inform her counsel that she began receiving mental health treatment in January 2025, or her counsel's failure to inquire if she was receiving mental health treatment or needed otherwise to supplement her discovery responses, prior to her June 4, 2025 psychiatric examination and her June 2 and 17, 2025 depositions. *See* Opp'n; Obj. to R&R. Plaintiff's lack of communication with her counsel does not excuse her failure to supplement her discovery responses timely, as she appears to believe, but proves instead that she lacked diligence and failed to comply with her discovery obligation.

Even if the court were to accept *arguendo* that Plaintiff's counsel worked diligently to obtain Plaintiff's medical records after learning on June 17, 2025 that she was receiving mental health treatment—and Plaintiff has provided no facts to support this assertion—Plaintiff's counsel's belated attempt to obtain these records is insufficient to establish Plaintiff's failure to comply with her discovery obligations was substantially justified or harmless.<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Plaintiff's first objection.<sup>6</sup>

Second, Plaintiff contends the court should reject the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to exclude Dr. Ho's expert report and testimony because Plaintiff did

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In her Opposition, Plaintiff argues her counsel attempted to obtain her mental health records "despite the fact that the fact discovery cutoff had already passed on June 22, 2025, and Plaintiff was under no obligation to supplement discovery responses after that date." Opp'n at 6 (erroneous fact discovery cut-off date listed). While it is true Plaintiff was not obligated to obtain these records after the close of fact discovery—she cannot expect to use evidence she did not disclose timely without proving "the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); *Merchant*, 993 F.3d at 740. Plaintiff has not met her burden here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The court's conclusion is further supported by Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate she obtained or provided these records to Defendant as of the date of this Order. *See* Obj. to R&R. While Plaintiff was certainly under no obligation to do so, she could have supported her arguments regarding diligence and harmlessness by producing all documents requested along with a detailed explanation of her efforts to obtain these medical records. Plaintiff did not.

3

4

5 6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21 22

23

24

25

26 27

28

not withhold raw data improperly, and instead acted diligently by "specifically request[ing] a stipulated protective order to allow for the production of Dr. Ho's raw data, while also continuing efforts to retrieve the third-party psychological records." Obj. to R&R at 11.7

The Magistrate Judge did not recommend exclusion of Dr. Ho's expert report and testimony for failure to disclose "raw data" or "testing data," as Plaintiff contends, see id. at 10–12, but because Plaintiff failed to provide the results of the tests Dr. Ho performed, as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii).8 Report at 16. While Plaintiff argues Dr. Ho's report is sufficient because it "fully identifies each of the ten (10) psychological tests administered and provides a detailed analysis of their results," Opp'n at 14, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that "identification of the tests and an analysis of their results is *not* the same as producing the results themselves," Report at 16 (emphasis in Report), and is insufficient to satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Percelle v. Pearson, Case No. 3:12-cv-05343-TEH, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) (prohibiting plaintiff's expert witness from relying on or testifying about a psychological test for failure to disclose test results timely under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii)).

Plaintiff does not offer any explanation for why the protective order would need to be amended specifically to allow Dr. Ho to identify and produce the results of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Plaintiff contends "Defendant's request for Dr. Ho's raw data came only after Defendant's own expert had completed and served their rebuttal report on July 25, 2025." Dkt. 84 at 7. The court disagrees. The evidence submitted establishes clearly that Defendant wrote to Plaintiff on June 30, 2025, stating Dr. Ho's expert report was deficient under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to "produce any of the test results ... used in preparing her report," and requested Plaintiff "supplement the expert witness report with the required documents by July 3." Dkt. 86-2 at 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> An expert report "must contain: (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; [and] (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

tests she performed.<sup>9</sup> *See* Obj. to R&R; Opp'n. Tellingly, neither Dr. Ho nor Plaintiff has requested any portion of Dr. Ho's expert report be sealed—even though Dr. Ho disclosed certain results in her expert report, Dkt. 68-2 at 47–51, which was not designated confidential under the protective order and which Defendant filed publicly without any objection.

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Plaintiff's second objection.

Third, Plaintiff argues the recommended evidentiary sanctions should be rejected because they are unduly harsh and because the Magistrate Judge did not consider lesser sanctions. Obj. to R&R at 12–14. As Plaintiff acknowledges, however, "the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court is only required to consider lesser sanctions when the opposing party formally requests one." *Id.* at 12–13 (citing *Merchant*, 993 F.3d at 741). Plaintiff is the opposing party on the subject Motion. As Plaintiff did not identify or request lesser sanctions from the Magistrate Judge, Opp'n, she cannot now object to the Report for failure to consider such sanctions. 11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The court declines to address whether Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires disclosure of Plaintiff's item-level responses, Dr. Ho's notes from the examination, or other "raw data" used to determine the test results as that question is not material to the court's ruling.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In her Objection, Plaintiff argues she should not suffer any sanctions because "Defendant never formally requested a lesser sanction[.]" Obj. to R&R at 13 (citing *Merchant*, 993 F.3d at 741). Defendant is the moving party—not the opposing party. Plaintiff's argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of *Merchant*. *See id*.

In her Objection, Plaintiff states: "If the Court determines that some remedy is appropriate, Plaintiff respectfully requests that it consider less severe alternatives. One option is to allow additional time for Plaintiff to obtain and produce the outstanding records from the out-of-state providers .... Another is the imposition of a modest monetary sanction, proportionate to any delay but reflecting an absence of bad faith." Obj. to R&R at 13–14. Plaintiff's request is DENIED. First, reopening discovery and granting Plaintiff yet another extension to comply with her discovery obligations is not a sanction. Second, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to establish that a "minor" monetary sanction, "estimated at no more than \$1,500 to \$3,000," Obj. to R&R at 15, is better suited to the circumstances than exclusion. See Merchant, 993

See Merchant, 993 F.3d at 741 ("[A] noncompliant party must avail [her]self of the opportunity to seek a lesser sanction by formally requesting one from the ... court.") (quotation marks omitted).

The court, therefore, OVERRULES Plaintiff's third objection.

## **CONCLUSION**

The court ACCEPTS the Report, Dkt. 82, OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objections, Dkt. 84, GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. 68, and ORDERS that Plaintiff is PRECLUDED from using on a motion, at a hearing, and at trial: (1) evidence of Plaintiff's mental health treatment by mental health professionals at any time after the termination of her employment with Defendant; and (2) Dr. Ho's expert report and testimony regarding Plaintiff's mental health, mental health treatment, and emotional distress damages. Defendant's evidentiary objections to the Zambrano Declaration (Dkt. 95-2) are OVERRULED as not material to the court's decision.

Plaintiff's counsel is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the R&R and this Order, and submit a declaration attesting to providing Plaintiff with both documents within seven days of the filing of this Order on the court's docket. Failure to comply with this Order and submit a declaration timely may result in the imposition of monetary sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2025

FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge

F.3d at 741 (recognizing "a party facing sanctions under [Rule 37(c)(1)] bears the burden of showing that a sanction other than exclusion is better suited to the circumstances.").